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Exemption from the Jurisdiction of
Canadian Courts
J.-G. CASTEL
I Persons against whom the jurisdiction cannot be enforced
The first part of this note deals with the persons who claim
immunity from the compulsory jurisdiction of Canadian courts.
(i) The Foreign State, Sovereign or Head of Foreign State as a
Defendant
The law relating to the immunity of foreign states and sovereigns or
heads of foreign states from Canadian jurisdiction is to be found in
the common law and has been stated and re-stated in leading cases
such as The Parlement Belge,1 The Porto Alexandre,2 The Cristina,
Dessaulles v. The Republic of Poland4 and Mehr v. The Republic
of China et al.5 Lord Atkin reduced this law to two propositions:
The first is that the courts of a country will not implead a foreign
sovereign, that is, they will not by their process make him against his
will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings involve process
against his person or seek to recover from him specific property or
damages.
The second is that they will not by their process, whether the
sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property
which is his or of which he is in possession or control.
6
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 [188o] 5 P.D. 197.
2 [1920] P.D. 30.
' [1938] A.C. 485.
4 [1944] S.C.R. 275-
5 [1956] O.W.N. 218.
6 The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, 490 (italics added). See also Hendry,
"Sovereign Immunity from the Jurisdiction of the Courts," (1958) 36 Can.
Bar Rev. 145.
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Canadian courts will not exercise jurisdiction over the person or
property of a foreign sovereign unless he is willing to submit to
process. Proceedings brought against a foreign government must be
stayed if it remains passive or if it moves to set the writ aside.
A foreign "state" includes an independent country of the Com-
monwealth,7 or a state under British protection,8 or a state which is
recognized de jure or de facto.'
Several reasons have been given for the basis of the immunity from
jurisdiction of a foreign state or sovereign or head of state, none of
which is free from criticism and most of which are now obsolete in
the light of modern conditions. For instance, it has been said that
since all states are independent and equally sovereign, no state is
amenable to the courts of another state. Par in parem non habet
imperium - each state must respect the dignity, equality and
independence of another state. It is an insult to implead a foreign
sovereign or state; to do so would vex the peace of nations. In other
words, it is incompatible with the dignity of a sovereign that he
should be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court.'"
Sovereign immunity is also held to be based on reciprocity or
comity. In return for a concession of immunity, other states or
sovereigns of such states make mutual concessions of immunity
within their territory. 1
Since, from a practical point of view, it is almost impossible to
enforce a judgment against a foreign state or sovereign or head of
state, any attempt to do so would be an unfriendly act.
The very fact that a state allows a foreign state to function within,
or a foreign sovereign or head of state to visit, its territory, signifies
a concession of immunity, as no foreign state or foreign sovereign
or head of state would enter Canada on any other terms.
7 Kahan v. Pakistan Federation, [195i] 2 K.B. 1003.
8 Duff Development Company Limited v. Government of Kelantan and An-
other, [1924] A.C. 797, 8o8.
9 The Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256. Re: Proof of Sovereignty: The
court takes judicial notice of the fact that a particular person is the sovereign
or head of foreign state; in case of difficulty, the usual practice is to obtain
a certificate from the Minister for External Affairs, whose statement is
conclusive: see ibid., 268.
10 Dessaulles v. Republic of Poland, [1944] S.C.R. 275, per Taschereau J.,
at 277.
11 In Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad and Another, [1958] A.C. 379, LordReid stated at 404: "The principle of sovereign immunity is not founded on
any technical rules of law: it is founded on broad considerations of public
policy, international law, and comity."
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Today the notion of dignity no longer provides an adequate basis
for the doctrine of sovereign immunity. A better view was expressed
by Lord Denning in Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad and
Another:
It is more in keeping with the dignity of a foreign sovereign to submit
himself to rule of law than to claim to be above it, and his indepen-
dence is better ensured by accepting the decisions of courts of acknow-
ledged impartiality than by arbitrarily rejecting their jurisdiction.
1 2
The immunity of a foreign sovereign or head of state not only
extends to his official acts, but also to acts committed in his private
capacity. In the case of Mighell v. Sultan of Johore,3 the Sultan of
Johore, living incognito in England, could claim sovereign immunity
in proceedings against him for breach of promise to marry an
Englishwoman.
Although the rule that a foreign state or sovereign or head of
state is immune from jurisdiction seems to be absolute, there are a
few cases where sovereign immunity is denied. As Viscount Simon
stated, "Their Lordships do not consider that there has been finally
established in England... any absolute rule that a foreign indepen-
dent sovereign cannot be impleaded in our courts in any circum-
stances"' 4 Sovereign immunity does not normally apply:
(a) to immovable property belonging to the foreign sovereign
and situated in Canada, other than that used for the purpose of the
diplomatic mission;"
(b) where a foreign sovereign is one of the claimants to a trust
fund falling within the jurisdiction of a Canadian court, 6 except
when the alleged trustee is the foreign sovereign or his agent;"
(c) to the winding-up of a company in whose assets the foreign
state or foreign sovereign claims an interest ;"8
12 [1958] A.C. 379, 418.
13 [1894] 1 Q.B. 149.
14 Sultan of Johore v. Abubakar, Tunku Aris Bendahara, [195] A.C. 318, 343.
15 The Charkieh (1873), L.R. 4 Ad. & E. 59, 97, obiter by Sir Robert
Phillimore, and see Article 31 (i)(a) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, infra.
16 Sultan of Johore v. Abubakar, Tunku Aris Bendahara, [1952] A.C. 318, 343;
Larivi~re v. Morgan (1872), L.R. 7 Ch. 55 o , aff'd sub nom Morgan v.
Larivi~re (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 423 as explained by Lord Radcliffe in U.S.A.
v. Dollfuss Mieg et Cie S.A. & Bank of England, [1952] A.C. 582, 617-18.
17 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad and Another, [ 1958] A.C. 379, 401 and
408.
is Re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, [i933] Ch. 745, 769-70.
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(d) to representative actions, such as debenture holder's actions,
where a foreign state or foreign sovereign is a debenture holder;1
(e) in cases where the immunity is waived;
(f) to acts jure gestionis where the theory of limited immunity
has been adopted by the courts.
Sovereign immunity also attaches to the government of a foreign
state2" and to its departments as well as to a foreign public cor-
poration, which may be considered as a department of the state.
The law is uncertain on the last point. Normally, if a foreign public
corporation has the character of a department of state, with no
separate juridical existence, the privilege of immunity may attach;
but, if under the foreign law, the corporation does have a separate
legal existence, and is not a department of the state, with the power
to conduct its own business, no trespass upon the sovereignty of the
state would result from denial of immunity to such a body. 1
However, in the cases of Krajina v. Tass Agency and Another2" and
Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional Del Trigo,2 3 it was held that
even if it is a separate incorporated legal entity, it may, by reason
of the degree of governmental control over it, be an organ (depart-
ment) of the state and therefore have immunity attached to it. 4
(2) The Foreign State, Sovereign or Head of State as a Claimant
Although a foreign sovereign or state cannot be sued in Canadian
courts, a recognized foreign state or sovereign or head of state may
sue or appear as a plaintiff in our courts. -5
19 Starke, An Introduction to International Law 220 (1967).
20 Duff Development Company, Limited v. Government of Kelantan and
Another, [1924] A.C. 797.
21 Wedderburn, "Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Public Corporations," (1950)
6 Int'l and Comp. L.Q. 290.
22 [1949] 2 All E.R. 274.
23 [1957] i Q.B. 438.
24 See Mellenger and Another v. New Brunswick Development Corporation,
[1971] 2 All E.R. 593 (C.A.). The question whether a particular body is a
department of the foreign government is a question of foreign law on which
the best (but not conclusive) evidence is that of the foreign ambassador:
Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional Del Trigo, [1957] s Q.B. 438, 471.
25 Benjamin Greene and John F. Gaynor v. The United States of America
(1902), 22 Que. S.C. 91; U.S.A. v. Motor Trucks Limited (1922), 52
O.L.R. 262, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 673.
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(3) Property of the Foreign State, Sovereign or Head of State
The general rule with respect to proprietary immunity is that the
courts will not "by their process, whether the sovereign is a party to
the proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his, or of
which he is in possession or control. 
2
It is not yet settled whether or not Canadian courts should always
apply this rule absolutely with no restrictions or grant immunity
only when the property which is the subject-matter of the suit was
used for public purposes as opposed to commercial purposes.27
However, according to section 47 (7) (c) of the Federal Court Act,
no action in rem may be commenced in Canada "against any ship
owned or operated by a sovereign power other than Canada, or any
cargo laden thereon, with respect to any claim where, at the time
the claim arose or the action is commenced, such ship was being
used exclusively for non-commercial governmental purposes.''2
In order to claim proprietary immunity, the foreign state,
sovereign or head of state must be the owner of the subject-matter
of the suit, such as a ship,29 or, if it is not the owner, it must show
that it is in de facto possession of the subject-matter through its own
servants or is in control of it. For example, in The Cristina, °
actual ownership by the foreign state did not have to be established,
and the foreign state could claim proprietary immunity of a ship
which it had merely requisitioned.
A foreign state may claim proprietary immunity in a case where
goods are in the possession of its bailee, such as in United States of
America and Republic of France v. Dollfuss Mieg et Cie S.A. and
Bank of England"' or where goods are in the possession of its agent,
such as in Rahimtoola v. H.E.H. The Nizam of Hyderabad and
Others.2
In order to obtain proprietary immunity, the foreign state need
20 The Cristina, [19381 A.C. 485, 490, per Lord Atkin.
27 See language of the courts in Le Gouvernement de la Republique Dimo-
cratique du Congo v. Venne (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 669 (S.C.C.); Flota
Maritima Browning De Cuba S.A. v. The Republic of Cuba, [1962] S.C.R.
598; Chateau-Gai Wines Limited v. Le Gouvernement de la Ripublique
Franfaise (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 709 (Ex. C.R.).
-28 S. C. 1970-71 , c-..
29 The Parlement Belge, [188o] 5 P.D. 197.
10 [ 938] A.C. 485.
.1 [1952] A.C. 582.
12 [1958] A.C. 379.
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not prove its title, but must only produce evidence showing that its
claim is neither merely illusory, nor founded on a title manifestly
defective." Also, in the case of Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad
and Others,4 where Pakistan had a legal title to a bank account but
no beneficial interest in it, Lord Somervell of Harrow stated that the
foreign sovereign only had to establish an arguable issue."
Proprietary immunity is also relevant in cases of taxation; the
property of a foreign state used for public purposes is not liable to
taxation. The basis of the immunity seems to be the principle that
the foreign state is immune from coactio, direct or indirect."6 The
exemption from municipal taxation applies to property used for
public purposes as a consulate,' 7 and to property used for diplomatic
purposes. 8 This position is reaffirmed by the two Vienna Conven-
tions. Article 23 of the I96i Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations declares that the sending state and the head of the mission
are exempt from all national, regional, or municipal dues and taxes
in respect of the premises of a mission, except those that represent
payment for specific services rendered. Article 34 of the same
Convention provides for the exemption of diplomatic agents from
taxation. Article 32 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations declares that consular premises and the official residence
of the head of a career consular post of which the sending state
is the owner or lessee are exempt from all national, regional, or
municipal taxes, except those that represent payment for specific
services rendered.
Exemption from taxation will also apply to leasehold interests
held by companies as bare trustees for a foreign government."
However, in the cases of Michigan State Bridge Commission v.
Point Edward" and Ogdensburg Bridge & Port Authority et al.
33 Juan Ysmael & Company Incorporated v. Government of the Republic of
Indonesia, [1955] A.C. 72.
34 [1958] A.C. 379.
"3 Rahimtoola v. The Nizam of Hyderabad and Others, [1958] A.C. 379, 410.
36 Yin-Tso Hsiung v. The City of Toronto, [i95o] O.R. 463, 467.
37 Yin-Tso Hsiung v. The City of Toronto, [1950] O.R. 463.
38 Reference Re Powers of the Corp. of City of Ottawa and Corp. of Village of
Rockcliffe Park to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioners'
Residences, [19431 S.C.R. 208.
39 Municipality of Saint John et al. v. Fraser Brace Overseas Corp. et al.,
[1958] S.C.R. 263.
40 [1939] 3 D.L.R. 533 (Ont. C.A.).
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v. Township of Edwardsburg,4 1 the Bridge Authorities were liable
to tax assessment with respect to lands on which international
bridges were constructed.
(4) Acta Imperii and Acta Gestionis: The Doctrine of Limited
Immunity
There is no international agreement as to the scope and extent of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Before discussing the Canadian
position, the British approach to the immunity of a foreign state, as
opposed to the American approach, must be mentioned.
In Britain, the courts have not yet adopted the distinction between
the public (acta jure imperii) and private (acta jure gestionis) acts
of state and a foreign state can plead immunity when it engages in
commercial activities.
The cases in which the doctrine of absolute immunity has been
applied have been cases involving mainly government ships used for
commercial purposes. The doctrine of absolute immunity which was
laid down in 88o in the case of The Parlement Belge, 2 has been
emphatically re-stated in succeeding English cases. 3 Thus, in The
Cristina, Lord Atkin said:
[T]he courts of a country ... will not by their process, whether the
sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property
which is his or of which he is in possession or control. There has been
some difference in the practice of nations as to possible limitations of
this second principle as to whether it extends to property only used for
the commercial purposes of the sovereign or to personal private pro-
perty. In this country it is... well settled that it applies to both.44
Lord Maugham, in The Cristina,4 5 and Lord Denning in Rahim-
toola v. Nizam of Hyderabad and Another4' tried to limit this
41 [1967] 1 O.R. 87.
42 [188o] 5 P.D. 197.
43 For example, the theory was applied in The Porto Alexandre, [192o] P.D.
30; The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485; Krajina v. The Tass Agency and
Another, [1949] 2 All E.R. 274; Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional Del
Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438; Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hydarabad and Another,
[1958] A.C. 379.
44 [1938] A.C. 485, 490.
45 [1938] A.C. 485, 521.
46 [1958] A.C. 379, 417 et seq. See also Sultan of Johore v. Abubakar,
Tunku Aris Bendahara, [19521] 1 All E.R. 1261, per Viscount Simon, at
1268.
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doctrine, but their lordships were not followed by the majority.
Their opinions seem to indicate that if a suitable case arose, the
House of Lords might take a different view.
The United States courts, on the other hand, have departed from
this traditional approach. Realizing the increasing participation of
foreign governments in commercial activities, the American courts,
after publication of the Tate Letter in 1952, have followed the
doctrine of restrictive, limited or qualified immunity in respect to
foreign governments: "It will hereinafter be the Department's
policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity."4 "
This doctrine is based on the view that the function of the state is
to govern, that is, to exercise legislative, judicial and administrative
authority. If it "descends into the arena of commerce" and engages
in transactions of private businessmen, it can no longer claim to be
accorded the dignity and equality of a sovereign." The grant of
immunity is of an exceptional nature and should be confined within
the rationale underlying the concept of immunity. When the state
acts as a private individual or has entered into a transaction which
does not involve its political or governmental powers, there is no
reason to grant immunity.
There is a difficult problem to be solved with respect to the
doctrine of limited immunity. Which test must be applied to dis-
tinguish between acta imperii and acta gestionis? Lord Denning laid
down the test of the nature of the dispute:
If the dispute brings into question, for instance, the legislative or
international transactions of a foreign government, or the policy of its
executive, the court should grant immunity if asked to do so, because it
does offend the dignity of a foreign sovereign to have the merits of such
a dispute canvassed in the domestic courts of another country: but if
the dispute concerns, for instance, the commercial transactions of a
foreign government (whether carried on by its own departments or
agencies or by setting up separate legal entities), and it arises properly
within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts, there is no ground for
granting immunity.50
47 The immunity may, however, be waived by the foreign state. See infra.
48 26 Dep't. State Bull. 984 (1952). See also Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Restatement of the Law, Second (1962), s. 69 and Victory
Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes
1964), 336 F. 2d 354, cert. den. (z965), 381 U.S. 934.
49 Schmitthoff, "The Claim of Sovereign Immunity in the Law of International
Trade," (1958) 7 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 452, 454-55.
50 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad and Another, [1958] A.C. 379, 422.
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Another test is the "purpose" or object of the act. An act is
"public" if the object of the performance is "public" in character. A
good test is that of the nature of the transaction. If the state uses
the forms of transactions available in private law, for example, by
purchasing goods from private traders this would indicate that the
transaction is jure gestionis and the foreign state should be treated
as a private individual.
Some of the judges in Quebec seem to favour the test of the
centre of gravity of the transaction in order to determine whether it
is public or private. 1
The Exchequer Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, in-
fluenced by English decisions, have applied the traditional doctrine
of absolute immunity. In the case of Brown v. S.S. Indochine,52 the
Exchequer Court held that all government-owned or government-
requisitioned ships, whether used for military, political or com-
mercial purposes, are in time of peace and war, immune from
seizure or arrest. In Thomas White v. The Ship Frank Dale5" the
Exchequer Court, citing The Cristina case54 again held that a
public ship engaged in commerce could claim immunity. However,
in the case of Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba S.A. v. The
Republic of Cuba,5" the Canadian Supreme Court hinted that it
might no longer consider the doctrine of sovereign immunity to be
absolute. In this case, there was no evidence before the court of the
purposes for which the public ships were to be used; the court said
that since the ships were available to be used by the Republic of
Cuba for any purpose which its government may select, the doctrine
of immunity would apply. The court expressed no opinion as to
whether sovereign immunity could apply to the commercial activities
of a state." The distinction was raised between state activities of a
51 See Allan Construction Ltd. v. Le Gouvernement du Vinizuela, [1969]
Qu6. P.R. 145, per Reid J., and C. Vincke, "Certain aspects de 1'6volution
r6cente du probl~me de l'immunit6 de jurisdiction des Etats," (1969) 7
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 224, 249.
52 (1922), 21 Ex. C.R. 4o6.
53 [1946] Ex. C.R. 555.
14 [s938] A.C. 485.
55 [i962] S.C.R. 598.
56 See, however, per Ritchie J., ibid., 604:
"The material before us clearly indicates that at the time of their arrest the
defendant ships, although lying idle in Halifax harbour and being equipped
as trading or passenger ships, were nonetheless owned by and in possession
of a foreign state and were being supervised by G.T.R. Campbell & Company
which company was accounting for such supervision to 'a division of the
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public nature and activities of a commercial nature, but the court
left the question unanswered, and the problem unsolved.
The Quebec courts, however, were able to make use of the silence
of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Flota Maritima case,5" and
decided to adopt in the recent Expo 1967 cases, the doctrine of
limited sovereign immunity. For example, in the case of Allan
Construction Ltd. v. Le gouvernement du Vgngzuela,5" the Superior
Court drew a distinction between public and private acts of the
state and held that the right of sovereign immunity can be pleaded
by a foreign state only with respect to public or political acts (jure
imperii) and not to acts having a commercial character (jure
gestionis). The Republic of Venezuela could not plead sovereign
immunity in an action for the recovery of the balance due under a
contract for the construction of its pavilion at Expo '67 because the
evidence showed that the pavilion was to be used principally for
commercial purposes.
In Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo,5" the plaintiff
sued the Republic of Congo for fees for professional services
rendered in preparing plans for the construction of a pavilion at
Expo '67. The Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the
defendant's declinatory exception based on the doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity. Brossard J. A. stated:
... the rule is no longer absolute, but it is subject in each case to the
circumstances, to "reason and good sense", to the reciprocal acquies-
Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces, Republic of Cuba'. Although the
ships might ultimately be used by Cuba as trading or passenger ships, there
is no evidence before us as to the use for which they were destined, and,
with the greatest respect for the contrary view adopted by Mr. Justice
Pottier who had the benefit of viewing the ships, I nevertheless do not feel
that we are in a position to say that these ships are going to be used for
ordinary trading purposes. All that can be said is that they are available to
be used by the Republic of Cuba for any purpose which its government may
select, and it seems to me that ships which are at the disposal of a foreign
state and are being supervised for the account of a department of govern-
ment of that state are to be regarded as "public ships of a sovereign state"
at least until such time as some decision is made by the sovereign state in
question as to the use to which they are to be put."
See also Locke J. at page 609.
57 [1962] S.C.R. 598.
58 [1968] R.P. 145. See L. Kos- Rabcewicz- Zubrowski, "Immunit6 de
juridiction. Etat ou gouvernement 6tranger. Exposition universelle de 1967,"
(1968) 6 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 242; C. Vincke, supra
note 5 1.
59 (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 128 (Que. C.A.) affirming [1968] P.R. 6.
The Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts 169
cence of the States whose sovereignty is in question, to the matter in
dispute in which the rule is being invoked, to the purely private or
commercial nature of the matter (jure gestionis), and to the direct
relationship which may exist between the matter in dispute and the
exercise by the sovereign State of its jus imperil, as the case may be.60
In Penthouse Studios Inc. v. Venezuela,61 the Quebec Court of
Appeal again rejected a plea of sovereign immunity in a case
involving the enforcement of a commercial contract.
These cases reveal that Quebec courts have definitely departed
from the traditional theory of absolute immunity; the plea of
sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked when a state
engages in commercial activities that are not manifestations of
sovereign authority. The courts of this province have also justified
their position by saying that a foreign sovereign, by entering into a
private law relation, impliedly waives his immunity.
In Le Gouvernement de la Ripublique Democratique du Congo
v. Venne6 ' the Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority of seven to
two, set aside the judgments of the Court of Appeal and of the
Superior Court of Quebec. Ritchie J., who wrote the opinion for the
majority, refused to discuss the question whether Quebec courts
should continue to apply the doctrine of qualified or restrictive sover-
eign immunity as he did not accept the finding of the trial judge that
when the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
employed Mr. Jean Venne to prepare sketches of the national
pavilion which it proposed to build at the International Exhibition,
it was not performing a public act of a sovereign state but rather
one of a purely private nature. His Lordship stated:
... in preparing for the construction of its national pavilion, a Depart-
ment of the Government of a foreign State, together with its duly
accredited diplomatic representatives, were engaged in the performance
of a public sovereign act of State on behalf of their country and ...
the employment of the respondent was a step taken in the performance
of that sovereign act. It therefore follows in my view that the appellant
could not be impleaded in the Courts of this country even if the
so-called doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity had been adopted
in our Courts, and it is therefore unnecessary for the determination of
this appeal to answer the question posed by Mr. Justice Owen and so
fully considered by the Court of Appeal. In an area of the law which
60 Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 128,
146-47. L. Serafini (1969), 15 McGill L. J. 493.
61 (1970), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 686 (Que. C.A.).
62 (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3 d) 669.
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has been so widely canvassed by legal commentators and which has
been the subject of varying judicial opinions in different countries, I
think it would be undesirable to add further obiter dicta to those which
have already been pronounced and I am accordingly content to rest
my opinion on the ground that the appellant's employment of the
respondent was in the performance of a sovereign act of State. 63
He also said:
... I am of opinion that the contract here sought to be enforced to
which the appellant's diplomatic representative and one of its Depart-
ments of Government were parties, was a contract made by a foreign
Sovereign in the performance of a public act of State and that whatever
view be taken of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it was a matter in
respect of which the Republic of the Congo cannot be impleaded in
our Courts. I would allow this appeal on that ground.6 4
The decision of the majority is somewhat ambiguous as no
attempt is made to clarify the law. To some, it might appear that
the majority has rejected the distinction between acts jure imperii
and jure gestionis and reaffirmed the doctrine of absolute immunity.
However, this does not seem to be the proper interpretation to be
given to this decision. The question is still open. If the act of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had been
characterized by the court as jure gestionis it would have had to
pass upon the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity.
In a very learned dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Laskin stated:
"To allow the declinatory exception is thus to reaffirm the doctrine
of absolute immunity. I have made plain my opinion that the
doctrine is spent."6 5 He points out that neither the independence
nor the dignity of states, nor international comity require vindication
through a doctrine of immunity: "Independence as a support for
absolute immunity is inconsistent with the absolute territorial juris-
diction of the host State; the dignity, which is a projection of
independence or sovereignty, does not impress when regard is had
to the submission of States to suit in their own Courts.... Nor is
63 At page 673.
64 At page 677-78.
65 At page 691. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
challenged the suit by a declinatory exception. Quebec Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, Article 164. Thus, the interlocutory proceedings became the vehicle
for the determination of the basic issue in the litigation, namely, the im-
munity of the foreign government from suit and from the jurisdiction of the
Quebec Superior Court.
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comity any more realistic a foundation for absolute immunity, unless
it be through treaty." 6
Laskin J. also rejects extraterritoriality as a prop of absolute
immunity.6 7 In his opinion, immunity must be considered from the
standpoint of function rather than status.
Affirmatively, there is the simple matter of justice to a plaintiff; there
is the reasonableness of recognizing equal accessibility to domestic
Courts by those engaged in transnational activities, although one of
the parties to a transaction may be a foreign State or an agency
thereof; there is the promotion of international legal order by making
certain disputes which involve a foreign State amenable to judicial
processes, even though they be domestic; and, of course, the expansion
of the range of activities and services in which the various States today
are engaged has blurred the distinction between governmental and
non-governmental functions or acts (or between so-called public and
private domains of activity), so as to make it unjust to rely on status
alone to determine immunity from the consequences of State action.",
In other words, immunity should attach to certain classes of func-
tions and not to others (for example, commercial transactions).
Section 43(7) (c) of the Federal Court Act69 which grants
immunity to a ship owned or operated by a foreign sovereign
power if at the time the claim arose or the action is commenced
such ship was being used exclusively for non-commercial govern-
mental purposes seems to recognize a contrario that an action in rem
could be commenced against such ship if it were used for commer-
cial purposes.
In the Quebec Court of Appeal, Owen J.A. had expressed the
view that mere proof that the party seeking immunity is a sovereign
state or any agency thereof is not sufficient. "Any attorney seeking
immunity from jurisdiction on behalf of a sovereign state should be
called upon to show, to the Court's satisfaction, that there is some
valid basis for granting such immunity."7 In the Supreme Court of
Canada, Ritchie J., for the majority, was of the opinion that the
66 At page 684.
67 See Rand J. in St. John v. Fraser-Brace Overseas Corp., [1958] S.C.R. 263,
267. A more realistic and flexible basis for immunity is to be found in the
conception of "an invitation by the host State to the visiting State."
68 At page 687.
69 S.C. 1970-71, c. I.
70 [1969] Que. Q.B. 8M8, 3 D.L.R. (3d) 128, 138. Note that in Sicard v. Le
Gouvernement de la Ripublique du VinizuIla, [1970] R.P. 97, sovereign
immunity was recognized as no sufficient proof was given that an act jure
gestionis was involved.
172 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1971
burden of proof does not lie upon the sovereign to show that the
act was a public one if it is to be granted sovereign immunity. He
said:
... [T]he question of whether the contract in question was purely
private and commercial or whether it was a public act done on behalf
of a sovereign State for State purposes, is one which should be decided
on the record as a whole without placing the burden of rebutting any
presumption on either party.7'
It must be noted that the Quebec courts have not distinguished
between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution.
From a practical and logical point of view, if a foreign state is not
immune from the jurisdiction of the Quebec courts with respect to
transactions jure gestionis it should not be immune from execution
of the judgment rendered against it. However, this judgment should
not be enforced against the property of the foreign state used for
public purposes.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Le Gouverne-
ment de la Ripublique Dimocratique du Congo v. Venne does not
mean that the doctrine of limited immunity has been rejected in
Canada. This doctrine is a sound one. Foreign states should not be
immune from suit in relation to their acts when engaged in private
enterprise. However, the best approach would seem to be that which
denies immunity to a foreign sovereign or state except in some
specific cases.7 ' This is more in keeping with the fact that the local
sovereign has gradually surrendered parts of his immunity from
suit.7"
(5) Diplomats
Until recently, in Canada, the rules governing diplomatic im-
munities were based on customary rules of international law,
incorporated in the domestic law of Canada. In addition, there was
and still is one statute in force in Canada, the Diplomatic Im-
munities (Commonwealth Countries) Act." However, in 1961, the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed by a large
71 At page 674.
72 See Lord Denning in the Nizam of Hyderabad's case, [I957] 3 W.L.R. 884,
91o, and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Problem of Jurisdictional Im-
munities of Foreign States," (1951) 28 Brit. Yr. Int'l L. 220.
73 In Canada, see, for instance, Crown Liability Act, S.C. 1952-53, c. 30.
74 S.C. 1953-54, 55, c. 54.
The Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts
number of countries including Canada. This Convention not only
removed many of the uncertainties existing in the area of diplomatic
immunities, but also codified the law on diplomatic immunities. The
Convention was ratified by Canada on May 26, I966."M In the
areas not covered by the Vienna Convention, the customary rules of
international law will continue to govern."6
An ambassador is the envoy or representative of a foreign
sovereign, and he has been granted certain privileges both as a token
of respect for the sending state and to ensure that he will be able to
fulfil his duties properly with no pressure or fear. The fiction of
exterritoriality, namely, that the ambassador and his suite and
property were legally outside the territory of the state, was also used
as an explanation of the immunities granted to diplomats. However,
this fiction, which for some time obtained a foothold in international
law, was abandoned in the Vienna Convention, which offers no
theoretical basis for the privileges and immunities it grants.
The most important feature of the Vienna Convention is that it
abolishes the theory of absolute diplomatic immunity. Diplomatic
immunity is now qualified.
The Convention draws a distinction between three categories of
persons entitled to diplomatic immunity in varying degrees of
importance - diplomatic agents, members of the administrative and
technical staff, and members of the service staff."
According to Article 31 of the Convention, a diplomatic agent
enjoys immunity from the criminal, civil, and administrative juris-
diction of the receiving state in respect both of his official and
private acts except in three cases: (a) real actions relating to
private immovable property in the territory of the receiving state,
unless held for the purposes of the mission, (b) actions relating to
succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as a private
person, and (c) actions relating to any professional or commercial
activity in a private capacity. The person and private residence of
a diplomatic agent are inviolable.." But a diplomatic agent who is a
75 As to the effect of ratification and the necessity for implementing legislation,
see Castel, Public International Law 827, 851. (1965).
76 The Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1708, 7 Anne, c. 12, was applicable in
Canada. Other countries have implemented the Vienna Convention: for
instance, Australia has passed the Diplomatic Privileges & Immunities Act,
1967 (Com.), s. 6 and the U.K. The Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964.
77 All these terms are defined in Article i of the Convention. The Convention
does not apply to foreign sovereigns themselves or their property.
78 Articles 29 and 3o of the Convention.
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national of or permanently resident in the receiving state shall enjoy
immunity only in respect of his official acts performed in the exercise
of his functions.79 The members of the family of a diplomatic agent
forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the
receiving state, enjoy the same privileges and immunities.8"
Members of the administrative and technical staff, such as
secretaries and clerks, along with members of their families in their
household, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in
the receiving state, enjoy the same immunities as diplomatic agents,
except that immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction does
not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties."1
Members of the service staff enjoy immunity only in respect of acts
performed in the course of their duties.8" Private servants of mem-
bers of the mission, if they are not nationals of, or permanently
resident in the receiving state, may enjoy privileges and immunities
only to the extent admitted by the receiving state.8 This would
seem to mean that they would enjoy immunity only in respect of
acts performed in the course of their duties.
Article 39 of the Convention provides that every person entitled
to immunities shall enjoy them the moment he enters the territory of
the receiving state and shall cease to enjoy them when he leaves the
territory or upon expiry of a reasonable period in which he can
leave. Immunity for acts done by a diplomatic agent in his official
capacity continues after he has ceased to be a diplomatic agent.8 4
But, an action begun against a person who is not entitled to diplo-
matic immunity at that time, must be stayed as soon as he becomes
entitled to diplomatic immunity. 5 In all cases the immunity is only
from jurisdiction in the receiving state and not from liability.
Therefore an action can always be brought against a person entitled
to immunity in his home state" or after his mission or employment
has ended in respect of acts done in his private capacity.
There are other new important provisions in the Vienna Con-
vention. Article 22 places a special duty on the receiving state to
79 Article 38 of the Convention.
so Article 37 (1) of the Convention.
81 Article 37 (2) of Convention.
82 Article 37 (3) of Convention.
83 Article 37 (4) ; also Article 38 (2).
84 Article 39 (2).
85 Ghosh v. D'Rozario, [1962] 2 All E.R. 640.
86 See Article 31 (4).
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take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission
against any intrusion or damage; the premises of the mission shall
be inviolable. Articles 23 and 34 provide for exemption from tax-
ation of diplomatic premises and of the diplomatic agent, subject to
a few exceptions; this exemption from taxation existed before the
Convention, that is, in customary international law.
Article 24 provides for the inviolability of the archives and
documents of the mission at any time and wherever they may be.
However, one exception could be provided to Article 24. According
to Rex v. Rose 7 and Rex v. Lunanss documents taken from the
files of a foreign embassy and in possession of Canada were not
entitled to diplomatic immunity when used in a prosecution against
a Canadian citizen. The court also said that it might be necessary to
consider whether a foreign ambassador is entitled to the privilege of
diplomatic immunity in circumstances where the acts with which
the prosecution is concerned are contrary to the safety and welfare
of Canada. At any rate, immunity could be invoked only by the
foreign government concerned, through its ambassador and should
be made in the first instance to the Department of External Affairs;
it could- not be raised by a Canadian, on trial in a Canadian court,
when the witness who was to produce the documents did not object
to testifying and did not claim immunity.
In addition to the Vienna Convention, there is one Canadian
statute, the Diplomatic Immunities (Commonwealth Countries)
Act, 9 which governs the rules concerning diplomatic immunities in
Canada. Briefly, the Act states that the chief representative of a
Commonwealth country, the members of the official staff and their
families and domestic staff, are entitled to immunities from suit and
legal process.9" A citizen of Canada is exempt only with respect to
acts done or omitted to be done in the course of the performance of
his duties as a member of such staff, nor are the members of his
family entitled to any immunity.9 ' Persons who perform duties
substantially corresponding to those which in the case of a foreign
sovereign are performed by a consular officer may be granted the
like immunities as are accorded to consular officers of foreign
87 (1947), 88 C.C.C. i14 (Que.).
88 [1947] O.R. 201.
89 S.C. 1953-54, c. 54.
90 Section 5.
91 Section 5 (4).
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sovereign powers.92 Immunity may be waived."5 Section 7 of the Act
states that if any question arises as to whether any person is entitled
to immunity, a certificate issued by the Secretary of State for
External Affairs shall be conclusive evidence.9" Reciprocity is the
basis for granting immunity.95
(6) Consuls
There is no Canadian legislation governing the immunities granted
to foreign Consuls. Therefore, in order to find out the Canadian
practice, it is necessary to examine first, the customary rules of
international law which have been laid down in a few Canadian
cases, and secondly, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations."6
According to a few Canadian decisions, which have followed
international custom, foreign consuls are not entitled to the pri-
vileges and immunities of diplomats. 7 The main reason for this is
the fact that a consul is an agent and not a representative of his
government.98 A consul's main duty is to protect the commercial
interests of the sending state, such as trade, and to assist nationals of
the sending state, such as seamen. A consul enjoys merely a limited
or qualified immunity from territorial jurisdiction. He can claim
immunity with respect to his official acts only; he enjoys no personal
immunity.99 In some cases, though, consuls may enjoy more exten-
sive immunities where they combine their consular with diplomatic
functions.
The position of a consulate is different; it cannot be sued for it is
an agency of a sovereign country. As stated in the case of Lazaro-
92 Section 6.
93 Section 8 of Act.
94 This provision concurs with the decision of Engelke v. Mussmann, [1928]
A.C. 433: "A statement made to the Court by the Attorney-General on the
instructions of the Foreign Office as to the status of a person claiming
immunity from judicial process on the ground of diplomatic privilege,
whether as ambassador or as a member of the ambassador's staff, is con-
clusive."
95 Section 3 (3).
96 (1963) 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 993.
97 Leonard v. Premio-Real (1885), 11 Q.L.R. 128.
98 Maluquer v. Rex (1924), 38 Que. K.B. i.
99 Campbell v. Cour des Sessions Ginrrales de la Paix (930), 49 Que. K.B.
65 and Lazarovitch v. Consulat Ginral de Grice et Pappas, [1968] Que.
C.S. 486.
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vitch v. Consulat Gineral de Grace et Pappas: "Un consulat est un
organisme d'un pays souverain, qui ne peut Etre contraint de com-
paraitre devant un tribunal du Quebec ni de se soumettre la
juridiction d'icelui. ' 100
The 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations attempts to
codify and to define more concretely consular privileges and
immunities. Although the Convention has not yet been ratified
by Canada, it is on many questions declaratory of customary rules
of international law and the principles stated in the Convention are
followed by the Department of External Affairs." 1 For instance,
Articles 31 and 33 assure the inviolability of consular premises,
archives and documents. Article 32 provides for the exemption from
taxation of consular premises. Article 35 discusses freedom of com-
munication on the part of the consular post for all official purposes.
In addition, the receiving state shall take all steps to prevent any
attack on the person, freedom or dignity of consular officers.'
Article 41 refers to the personal inviolability of consular officers.
Article 43 states that consular officers and consular employees shall
not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative
authorities of the receiving state in respect of acts performed in the
exercise of consular functions.
This immunity, however, cannot be invoked in the case of a civil
action (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer
or a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or
impliedly as an agent of the sending state, or (b) by a third party
for damage arising from an accident in the receiving state caused
by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.
(7) Foreign Armed Forces
The extent of the immunity of foreign armed forces depends on
the circumstances in which the forces were admitted by the territorial
sovereign, and in particular upon the absence or presence of legis-
lation governing the entry of these forces. At common law, the
armed forces of a foreign sovereign enjoy a limited, but not absolute
immunity from the territorial jurisdiction. This immunity is necessary
in order to maintain those forces efficiently for the service of the
foreign sovereign. The leading Canadian case on the status of
100 [i968] Que. C.S. 486.
101 (1969) 7 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 304.
102 Article 40.
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visiting forces is Reference Re Exemption of U.S. Forces From
Canadian Criminal Law."'3 In this case, three different views were
presented by the Supreme Court of Canada, thereby leaving the
state of the law unsettled. Duff C.J. and Hudson J. held that foreign
forces were not immune from Canadian criminal jurisdiction.
Kerwin J. and Taschereau J. held that they were immune. Rand J.
took the middle point of view and stated that foreign forces are
exempt from Canadian criminal jurisdiction only for offences com-
mitted in their own camps or on their own warships.
This unsettled state of the law has been removed, for the criminal
and civil liability of members of foreign armed forces is now
extensively covered by the Visiting Forces Act."' The immunity of
foreign forces from Canadian jurisdiction is not absolute, but
restricted; sections 5 and 6 of the Act list the offences over which
Canadian civil courts and foreign military courts can exercise their
jurisdiction respectively. Part III of the Act is concerned with
claims for personal injuries and property damages. For instance,
section 17 states that "A member of a visiting force is not subject to
any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment given against
him in Canada in respect of a matter that arose while he was acting
within the scope of his duties or employment." Part V covers
exemption from taxation of members of foreign forces. Part IV is
concerned with security provisions.
(8) International Organizations
In the past few decades, there has been an increase in the number
of international organizations. In order to secure for them both
legal and practical independence, and to enable them to carry out
their functions efficiently, these organizations, their officials and
representatives of member states have been granted certain privileges
and immunities. All these privileges and immunities are to be found
in international treaties and conventions. Article i 05 of the United
Nations Charter declares that the representatives of the member
states and officials of the Organization shall enjoy "such privileges
103 [1943] S.C.R. 483. In this case two other well-known cases were referred to,
namely, Schooner "Exchange" v. M'Faddon (1812), 7 Cranch 1 16, and
Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, [1939] A.C. i6o.
104 S.C. 1967-68, c. 23. This Act repealed three preceding Acts, namely,
Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 283; Visiting
Forces (North Atlantic Treaty) Act, R.S.C. 1952, C. 284; Visiting Forces
(U.S.A.) Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 285.
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and immunities" as are necessary for the independent exercise of
their functions in connection with the Organization. In 1946, the
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations and its officials. Canada ratified
this Convention on June 22, 1948 with a reservation regarding
taxation; by this ratification, Canada has bound herself to the
provisions of the Convention. Article 19 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice declares that "The members of the Court,
when engaged in the business of the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities." In 1947, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations; Canada acceded
to this Convention on March 29, 1966 with a reservation regarding
taxes."' 5
In Canada, two statutes have been passed with respect to the
privileges and immunities accorded to international organizations.
The Privileges and Immunities (NATO) Act,' and the Privileges
and Immunities (International Organizations) Act0 7 both provide
for the immunity of the international organizations, their property
and assets, from every form of legal process."° The premises, arch-
ives and documents of the same organizations shall be inviolable.'0 9
All official correspondence shall be free from censorship." 0 Every
representative of member states of the organization shall enjoy the
immunities and privileges granted to diplomats. 1' The above are
just a few of the many provisions found in the two Canadian
statutes. In general, the privileges and immunities granted to
international organizations, their officials, and representatives of
member states are very similar to those enjoyed by foreign states and
diplomats.
105 (1969) 7 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3o6.
106 R.S.C. 1952, C. 218.
107 R.S.C. 1952, C. 219, as amended by S.C. 1964, c. 47. Poelui Dai, "The
Headquarters Agreement between Canada and the International Civil
Aviation Organization," (1964) 2 Canadian Yearbook of International Law
205.
10s Article 5 of Privileges and Immunities (NATO) Act, and section 2 of
Privileges and Immunities (International Organizations) Act.
109 Articles 6 and 7 of Privileges and Immunities (NATO) Act, and sections
3 and 4 of Privileges and Immunities (International Organizations) Act.
110 Article i i of Privileges and Immunities (NATO) Act and section 9 of
Privileges and Immunities (International Organizations) Act.
11 Article 12 of Privileges and Immunities (NATO) Act and section ii of
Privileges and Immunities (International Organizations) Act.
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(9) Waiver of Immunity
If any of the persons entitled to immunity under international law
waives his immunity, that is to say, voluntarily submits to the
territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state,, that state is entitled to
exercise jurisdiction over him. However, waiver, in order to be
effective, must be done in the proper manner and form.
At common law, sovereign immunity is waived where the foreign
sovereign voluntarily begins an action in a Canadian court as a
plaintiff. When a foreign state or government sues in Ontario, it
thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court merely to
the extent necessary to enable the court to do justice on the claims
sued upon.112 The defendant is then entitled to raise any defence or
set-off available to him, including a counter-claim,"1 provided it is
directly related to the plaintiff's cause of action."
Sovereign immunity is also waived where the foreign sovereign
appears as a defendant without objection and fights the case on its
merits. However, as decided in the case of Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio
Nacional Del Trigo,"' the appearance must be made by a person
with knowledge of the right to be waived and with the authority
of the foreign sovereign.
Another method of waiver of sovereign immunity occurs where
the foreign sovereign expressly submits to the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and determine the very proceedings which have been
commenced against him. Lord Esher, M.R. stated that the foreign
sovereign's submission to the jurisdiction must be done "when the
Court is about or is being asked to exercise jurisdiction over him,
and not any previous time.1 1 6
112 U.S.A. v. Motor Trucks Ltd. (1922), 52 O.L.R. 262, 289.
113 Ripublique de Pologne v. Dessaulles, [1943] Que. K.B. 224, 229.
114 Mehr v. The Republic of China et al., [1956] O.W.N. 218, 2i9; South
African Republic v. Compagnie Franco-Belge, [1898] C h. 190, 195.
115 [1957] 1 Q.B. 438.
116 Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q.B. 149, 159. A defendant cannot
be taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction by entering a plea to the
effect that it is not subject thereto. Le Gouvernement de la Ripublique
Dimocratique du Congo v. Venne (1972) 22 D.L.R. (3d) 669 (S.C.C.),
per Ritchie J. at page 679 relying upon Duff Development Company,
Limited v. Government of Kelantan and Another, [1924] A.C. 797. See
also Laskin J. at page 68i.
"English law has been consistent in holding that waiver and submission
to jurisdiction on the part of a foreign sovereign State must, to be effective,
be made in the face of the court and at the time the court is asked to
exercise its jurisdiction."
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In view of the adoption by Quebec courts of the doctrine of
limited immunity there is no reason why a foreign sovereign should
not be bound by a clause in a commercial contract whereby he
agrees in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, or to
arbitration." 7
Waiver of sovereign immunity also occurs where the foreign
sovereign is bound by declaration, law, or treaty, to submit to
particular proceedings against him. A foreign sovereign who is
capable of undertaking binding stipulations with other sovereigns
should also be able to do so in private law relations.
With respect to waiver of diplomatic immunity, the rules are now
more definite, for they are governed by the 1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. Article 32 of the Convention declares that
diplomatic immunity may be waived by the sending state; waiver
must always be express. There is no provision that the waiver must
take place at the time when the court is asked to exercise jurisdiction
as is the case at common law. Article 32 (4) also declares that a
waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not imply waiver of
immunity in respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a
separate waiver shall be necessary."' A diplomatic agent may not
claim immunity with respect to a counterclaim against him relating
to a claim he himself brought before the court."' Where the Vienna
Convention is not clear, the common law still applies. Therefore,
where Article 32 (I) provides that diplomatic immunity "may be
117 See Allan Construction Ltd. v. The Government of Venezuela, [1968] P.R.
145, per Reid J. 'at 175 and 178. In Government of the Republic of
Venezuela and Another v. Altschuler, [1970] B.R. 828 (res.), the Quebec
Court of Appeal held that by asking security for costs the foreign state
waived its immunity.
In Le Gouvernement de la Ripublique Dimocratique du Congo v. Venne
(1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 669, Laskin J. dissenting, said, at page 681:
"... a previous agreement to submit, although part of contract sued
upon, is not binding upon the foreign Government which may resile from it.
Whether or not the time may come when waiver by contractual agreement
will be recognized as effective (as proposed, for example, by the Restatement
(Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United States (0965) s. 70), the
present case may be disposed of on this issue without relying on the English
rule, which is also the prevailing rule in the United States. There was here
no contractual submission, but, from the outset, a resistance to jurisdiction,
subject to the courtesy of an appearance to contest it."
118 At common law the question is not finally settled. See Re Suarez, [1917]
Ch. 385; Duff Development Co. v. Government of Kelantan, [1924] A.C.
797, 8io, 821, 830.
119 Article 32 (3).
182 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1971
waived by the sending state," and says no more, it seems that the
following rule with reference to waiver of diplomatic immunity
would still apply, namely,
... [Ilt is clear that.., waiver must be a waiver by a person with full
knowledge of his rights and a waiver by or on behalf of the chief
representative of the state in question. In other words, it is not the
person entitled to a privilege who may waive it unless he does so as
agent or on behalf of the representative of the country concerned; it
must be the waiver of the representative of the state.
2
The immunity is the privilege of the state, and not of the individual.
From the above quotation, it is evident that members of the
administrative and technical staff of the mission or of the service
staff, or members of the family of a diplomatic agent entitled to
diplomatic immunity cannot themselves waive their immunity;
waiver, to be valid, can be done only by their superior, that is, the
head of the mission. But it is not clear if the head of the mission
can waive his own immunity. Schwarzenberger claims that the head
of the mission cannot waive his own immunity, because the right to
immunity is enjoyed by the state, and is not granted to any diplomat
in a personal capacity. Therefore, the immunity of the head of the
mission can be waived only by or with the permission of his own
government.' In Canada, in the Diplomatic Immunities (Com-
monwealth Countries) Act,"2 section 8 states that "a chief repre-
sentative may waive any immunity to which ... he or his staff..."
is entitled. But, it must be kept in mind that this Act refers only
to diplomats from Commonwealth countries.
Consular immunities may be waived. Article 45 of the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations discusses waiver of
immunity. It contains the same provisions with respect to waiver as
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
except that it states that waiver must not only be express but, in
addition, shall be communicated to the receiving state in writing.
The immunities of international organizations and their represen-
tatives may also be waived."'
120 R. v. Madan, [1961] i All E.R. 588, 591 (Italics added).
121 Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law 94 (i96o).
122 S.C. 1953-54, c. 54.
123 See Articles 5 and 15 of the Privileges and Immunities (NATO) Act,
R.S.C. 1952, c. 2 18 and Sections 2 and 14 of the Privileges and Immunities
(International Organizations) Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 219.
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II Persons who cannot invoke the jurisdiction of Canadian courts:
Enemy Aliens
During the existence of a state of war between Canada and an
enemy country, an enemy alien cannot bring an action before
Canadian courts.1 24
(i) Definition of Enemy Alien
At common law, "enemy alien" means any person who voluntarily
resides or carries on business in a territory belonging to, or occupied
by, 5 a nation or power at war 2 with Canada. Therefore, the
test of enemy character of an individual is not nationality, but
residence. 27 This test is an objective territorial one, and depends on
facts and not on the person's prejudices or passions or his patriot-
ism." ' A Canadian citizen voluntarily resident in, or carrying on
business in, an enemy's country is an enemy alien.
The subjects of enemy states residing in Canada are not necessarily
"alien enemies."' 29 They may be considered as "alien friends,"'2 °
and entitled to the enjoyment of all personal rights of citizens
including the right to sue in Canadian courts.'
Under the War Measures Act, the Governor in Council may take
such orders and regulations as he may, by reason of the existence
of real or apprehended war, deem necessary for the security, defence,
peace, order and welfare of Canada. Thus, during the last two
124 For example, Canadian Stewart Co. v. Perih (1915), 17 Que. P.R. 291,
(i916), 25 Que. K.B. 158; Dangler v. Hollinger Gold Mines (1915), 23
D.L.R. 384 (Ont.).
125 For example, Sovfracht (v/o) v. Van Udens Scheepvaart En Agentuur
Maatschappij (N.V. Gebr.), [1943] A.C. 203, 209; Porter v. Freudenberg,
[1915] 1 K.B. 857.
126 Courts will take judicial notice of a state of war: Stanford v. Nicoleau
(1941), 45 Que. P.R. 298 (S.C.); Rex v. Trainor (i9i6), 33 D.L.R. 658
(Alta S.C.).
127 Reventlow v. Rur Mun of Streamstown (1917), 37 D.L.R. 394, 396 (Alta
S.C.); Lampel v. Berger (1918), 38 D.L.R. 47 (Ont.).
128 Sovfracht etc. v. Van Udens etc., [1943] A.C. 203, 219.
129 Latha v. Halycznk (1918), 14 O.W.N. 219, 220. An alien residing in
Quebec is not an enemy merely because he was born in a country at war
with Canada: De Kozarijouk et al v. B. & A. Asbestos Co. (1914), 16
Que. P.R. 213; Sap v. Picard (1919), 20 Que. P.R. 178; Viola &
McKenzie, Mann & Cie (915), 24 Que. K.B. 31.
130 Ragusz v. Harbour Commissioners of Montreal, [i956] 30 D.L.R. 662, 663
(Que. K.B.).
131 Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K.B. 857, 869.
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world wars, Defence of Canada Regulations were passed which
dealt with the definition of enemy aliens and their rights and
disabilities."3 2
Enemy character may also attach to corporations. The test
normally used to determine enemy character is the place of incor-
poration and residence or domicile of the company. However, in the
case of Daimler Co. Ltd. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. Ltd, 3'
the court examined the character of the company's agents or the
persons in de facto control of its affairs.' Although the company
was incorporated and resident in England, it was assumed to have
enemy character because the people de facto in control of its affairs
resided in enemy territory. In Sovfracht etc. v. Van Udens etc.,"'
the test of incorporation and residence of the company was applied,
and a company incorporated in the Netherlands and having its
principal place of business in Rotterdam was refused the right to
proceed in an English court, because it acquired enemy character
when the Netherlands were invaded by the enemy of England.
When a company moves its domicile or residence out of a
country before it becomes occupied by the enemy, it will not be
considered as an enemy alien."'
(2) Enemy Alien as Plaintiff
An enemy alien has no persona standi in judicio, in other words,
he cannot sue in a Canadian court, either by himself or by any
32 R.S.C., 1927, c. 2o6. Now see R.S.C., 1970, c. W-2. See, for instance, The
Consolidated Orders respecting Trading with the Enemy 1916, s. i () (b).
" 'Enemy' shall extend to and include a person (as defined in this order)
who resides or carries on business within territory of a state or sovereign
for the time being at war with His Majesty, or who resides or carries on
business within territory occupied by a state or sovereign for the time being
at war with His Majesty, and as well any person wherever resident carrying
on business, who is an enemy or treated as an enemy and with whom
dealing is for the time being prohibited by statute, proclamation, the
following orders and regulations or the common law ... " See also Trasciati
v. Roncarelli et al., [1945] Que. K..B 454. Now see Revised Regulations
Respecting Trading with the Enemy (943), in Schedule to the Trading
with the Enemy (Transitional Powers) Act, S.C. 1947, c. 24, s. I (d).
"'3 [iq96] 2 A.C. 307.
134 "A company may.. .assume an enemy character.., if its agents or the
persons in de facto control of its affairs... are resident in an enemy
country, or, wherever resident, are adhering to the enemy or taking
instructions from or acting under the control of enemies": Daimler Co.
Ltd. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. Ltd., [1916] 2 A.C. 307, 345.
... T1943] A.C. R63 .136 The Pamia, [1943] 1 All E.R. 269.
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person on his behalf, during the progress of the war, unless he is
resident in Canada by a royal licence, express or implied, or unless
he is protected by a proclamation. This rule, which is based on
public policy, namely, the protection of the state in time of war," 7
creates a procedural incapacity which lasts only as long as the war
lasts. 3s
In the earlier cases, it was decided that the outbreak of war
completely prevented an enemy alien from bringing an action
during war and if an action had begun before the war, the enemy
alien could not continue his action until the war was over. It is
deemed to be suspended by force majeure.' Similarly, if he had
given notice of appeal before the war, the hearing of his appeal had
to be suspended until after the restoration of peace. 4 ' In Ontario,
section 18(6) of The Judicature Act'4 ' which in certain cases pro-
vides for a "stay of proceedings" has been interpreted as applicable
to enemy aliens. In Luczycki v. Spanish River Pulp & Paper Mills
Co., 4' the court said: "... so long as the plaintiff remained
quiescent during the war, no order to stay proceedings till the close
of the war was really needed.... Should any intervention of the
Court be asked, it is not to be by way of dismissal but at most by
way of staying the proceedings till the termination of the war."' 43
There must be sufficient evidence to show that the enemy will
benefit from the action before a stay of proceedings will be ordered
by the court. In the case of Will P. White Ltd. v. T. Eaton Co.,'
137 Sovfracht etc. v. Van Udens etc. [1943] A.C. 203, 213; Korziwiski v.
Harris Construction Co. Ltd. (i9s6) 18 Que. P.R. 97.
138 In Rex v. Bottrill, [5947] K.B. 41, 53, the court stated that the certificate
issued by the Minister for External Affairs is conclusive evidence of an
existing state of war.
139 De Kozarijouk v. B & B Asbestos Co. (1914), 16 Que. P.R. 213. Pesco v.
Belleville (1941), 45 Que. P.R. 49: plaintiff residing in occupied France
may ask suspension of procedure during the war.
140 Porter v. Freudenberg, [19151 1 K.B. 857, 884.
'4' R.S.O. 1970, c. 228.
142 (915), 34 O.L.R. 549.
143 Ibid., 555. In the case of Dumenko v. Swift Canadian Company Ltd.
(1914), 32 O.L.R. 87, where the plaintiff, an enemy alien, moved for an
order staying all proceedings, the plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and then
the action was dismissed on the defendant's motion. However, the Dumenko
case was distinguished in the Luczycki case, and in the latter case the judge,
in refusing to dismiss the action, justified the Dumenko decision on the
fact that the plaintiff, an enemy alien, was in default of giving security
for costs, and thus the action was well dismissed.
144 (z16), 36 O.L.R. 447, (t16), 3o D.L.R. 459.
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there was insufficient evidence to show that the money sued for was
to be paid to enemy aliens, and the court refused to make an order,
on the defendant's application, to stay the proceedings until the ter-
mination of the war; therefore, the action continued and the
defendants had to pay the money sued for. 4 '
Where the plaintiff, who later becomes an enemy alien on the
outbreak of war, brings an action which is quite unsustainable and
frivolous, the action is not suspended during war, but the defendant
can move to have it dismissed.'46
The common law rule strictly limiting an enemy alien in his civil
rights has now been modified in his favour when he resides in this
country by licence or under the protection of the Crown.117 For
example, an enemy alien, provided he was resident in Canada, was
given the right to maintain an action in Canadian courts, pursuant
to the Order-in-Council of August 15, 1914,48 or Regulation 24
of The Defence of Canada Regulations, 1939 .149 Both proclamations
stated that:
All enemy aliens in Canada so long as they peacefully pursue their
ordinary avocations shall be allowed to continue to enjoy the protection
of the law and shall be accorded the respect and consideration due to
peaceful and law-abiding citizens .... 150
Thus, it was held in Kristo v. Hollinger Consolidated Mines Ltd.,"'
Topay v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company,"' Trefnicek v. Martin"'
and Oskey v. City of Kingston". that the 1914 proclamation meant
that an enemy alien had the right to bring and maintain an action
in a Canadian court during the war, provided he peacefully pursued
145 See also Radley v. Garber (1915), 50 Que. S.C. 264.
146 Eickengruen v. Mond, [1940] Ch. 785.
147 Topay v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company (1914), 18 D.L.R. 784
(B.C.S.C.).
148 Can. Gaz. August 22, 1914, at 617.
149 Can. Gaz. September i I, 1939.
1-50 As to the rights of enemy aliens while interned and after the internment
ceases, see Gusetu v. Date (1915), 17 Que. P.R. 95; Harasymczuk v. Montreal
Light, Heat & Power Co. (i916), 25 Que. K.B. 252; Re Chamryk (0914),
19 D.L.R. 236 (Man.); Re Beranek (915), 25 D.L.R. 564 (Ont.);
Gusetu v. Laing (i916), 18 Que. P.R. 371, (1915), 48 Que. S.C. 427;
Fabry v. Finlay (i916), 50 S.C. 14; Swail v. Trieber (1916), 17 Que. P.R.
428; Roncarelli v. Garbarino et al., [1943] Que. S.C. 304.
151 (1917), 41 O.L.R. 51.
152 (1914), 18 D.L.R. 784 (B.C.S.C.).
153 [1939] O.W.N. 587.
154 (1914), 2o D.L.R. 959 (Ont.).
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his usual occupation."5 ' The protection of the Canadian courts, as
provided by the proclamations, did not extend to an enemy alien
not resident in Canada," even if he were resident in a neutral
state." 7
(3) Enemy Alien as Defendant
There is no rule of common law which prevents an enemy alien
from being sued if service or substituted service can be effected.
Rule 16 of the Rules of Practice of Ontario allows for substituted
service by advertisement or otherwise where the plaintiff is unable
to effect prompt personal service; this rule has been applied to
enemy aliens. For example, in the case of Porter v. Freudenberg,"18
substituted service was allowed upon an enemy alien in Germany.
But:
In order that substituted service may be permitted, it must be clearly
shown that the plaintiff is in fact unable to effect personal service and
that the writ is likely to reach the defendant or to come to his
knowledge if the method of substituted service which is asked for by
the plaintiff is adopted.1 59
Therefore, in the case of Saskatoon Mortgage & Loan Co. Ltd. v.
Roton et al.,"' an order for substitutional service of a writ of
155 Raguez v. Harbour Commissioners (1916), 18 Que. P.R. 98.
In the case of Pescovitch v. Western Canada Flour Mills Co. (1914),
18 D.L.R. 786 (Man. K.B.), the court also held that there is no onus on
the plaintiff, the enemy alien, to prove that the proclamation applies to
him; the burden is on those asserting the fact that the enemy alien is not
entitled to the protection of the law. Cf. Bassi v. Sullivan (i914), i8
D.L.R. 452 (Ont.). In Viola v. MacKenzie Mann & Co. (1915), 24 Que.
K.B. 31 it was held that, unless hostile acts are alleged and proved against
the alien, he must be deemed to have the same rights as before the war.
In Baumfelder v. Sec. of State of Canada, [1927] Ex. C.R. 86, MacLean J.
said at page 92: "A German national residing in Canada during the war
and not deported or declared by the Governor in Council to be an enemy
is clearly not an enemy within the terms of Part II of the Order, and I
think as a matter of public policy such was not intended."
156 De Kozarijouk v. B & A Asbestos Co. (1914), 16 Que. P.R. 213; Canadian
Stewart Co. v. Perih (1916), 25 Que. K.B. 158.
157 Newman v. Bradshaw (iqx6), 28 D.L.R. 769 (B.C. S.C.). Cf. The J. G.
White Engineering Co. et al. v. Canadian Car and Foundry Co. (1940),
43 Que. P.R. 419; Lampel v. Berger (19x7), 38 D.L.R. 47 (Ont.).
158 [1915] 1 K.B. 857.
159 Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] i K.B. 857, 888.
160 [1942] 3 D.L.R. 54 (Sask. C.A.). See also Cantieri Riuniti Dell' Adriatico
di Monfalcone v. Gdynia Ameryka Linje Zeglugowe Spolka Akcyjna, [i939]
4 D.L.R. 491 (N.S.) where service ex juris was made in juris.
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summons on the defendant, residing in France, was not made where
it appeared from the material filed that no information in respect of
the proceedings would reach the defendant.
Once the alien enemy is sued:
... It follows that he can appear and be heard in his defence and may
take all such steps as may be deemed necessary for the proper present-
ment of his defence.... To deny him that right would be to deny him
justice and would be quite contrary to the basic principles guiding the
King's Courts in the administration of justice.
Equally it seems to result that, when sued, if judgment proceed against
him, the appellate Courts are as much open to him as to any other
defendant. 6
Once an enemy alien is sued, therefore, he has the right to appear
and defend the action ;16 he also has the right to appeal against any
decision given against him. However, if the judgment is in his
favour and is appealed from, the appellant may ask for the sus-
pension of the proceedings in appeal.'63 In Rydstrom v. Krom'nT
the court held that alien enemies, who are successful defendants,
should not be deprived of their costs. There are, however, some
restrictions; an enemy alien may not counterclaim,' 65 nor take third
party proceedings, 6 ' nor execute a judgment for costs during the
war,'67 because in doing so, he would become an "actor."
161 Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K.B. 857, 883.
162 For a special case where an enemy alien was sued in Alberta under con-
ditions which compelled her to take action, see Reventlow v. Rural Mun. of
Streamstown (1917), 37 D.L.R. 394 (Alta.).
163 Canadian Stewart Co. v. Perih (1916), 25 Que. K.B. 158.
164 (1915), 7 W.W.R. i29o (B.C.S.C.).
165 Re Stahlwerk Becker A/G's Patent, [1917] 2 Ch. 272.
166 Halsey v. Lowenfeld, [1916] 2 K.B. 707.
167 Robinson & Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. of Mannheim, [1915] 1 K.B.
155.
